Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.
Introduction
In the field of political science, the study of the a priori distribution of power in a voting body has a main role. A particular class of Transferable Utility (TU) games, the simple games, can be used to model the decision-making process. Different power indices have been suggested in order to assess the a priori distribution of power among the players. A power index gives a measure of the ability that players have to transform a losing coalition into a winning one. We arise far from consensus over the issue of choice of an appropriate power index in a given context, and several power indices are employed.
The main power indices of the literature include the Shapley-Shubik index [7] , the Banzhaf index [2] , the Deegan-Packel index [3] and the Public Good Index [4] . The first two power indices are based on vulnerable winning coalition. A winning coalition is vulnerable when it has at least one member whose removal would cause the resulting coalition to be a losing coalition. An agent is considered critical when his elimination from a winning coalition turns this coalition into a losing coalition. In Banzhaf's model, the power of an agent is proportional to the number of coalitions in which he is critical.
A minimal winning coalition is one such that all its members are critical. According to Deegan and Packel [3] , only minimal winning coalitions should be considered in establishing the power of a voter. They assume that all minimal winning coalitions are equiprobable and all the voters in a minimal winning coalition divide the spoils equally. With this assumption, they define the Deegan-Packel index. Holler [4] proposes that only minimal winning coalitions should be considered when it comes to measuring power and the outcome is a public good and he defines the Public Good Index. The Public Good Index is determined by the number of minimal winning coalitions containing the voter divided by the sum of such numbers across all the voters.
Several desirable properties have been introduced in the context of power indices. In this paper, some of these properties will be mentioned, as well as some characterizations of the main power indices according to them. We define two modifications of the DeeganPackel index and two modifications of the Public Good Index. Although it will not be discussed which index is most appropriate, two real-world examples taken from the political field are used to compare the results obtained with different power indices. We should mention that issues related to those of this paper have been studied by Pinto [6] .
Simple games
ð Þ ð Þ this index, we use an argument similar to that employed to Holler to define the Public Good Index. Using a parallel argument to that used by Deegan and Packel, we could define an index similar to Deegan-Packel index and it is given by the formula as the power index f 0 , g 0 satisfies efficiency, null player and symmetry. It is easy to prove that a player is null if and only if he does not belong to none of the minimal winning coalitions. Then, in this case, the set of null players is empty. Then, f coincides with f 0 , and g coincides with g 0 , because the sets Wi v and WNPi v are equal, for every player i.
Player 1 belongs to two minimal winning coalitions of size 2 and to two minimal winning coalitions of size 3. Players 2 and 3 belong to one minimal wining coalition of size 2 and to one minimal winning coalition of size 3. Player 4 belongs to three minimal winning coalitions of size 3. Finally, players 5 and 6 belong to one minimal winning coalition of size 3. 
